**Sarah Zukerman Daly***,* MIT, ***“Bankruptcy, Guns or Campaigns: Explaining Armed Organizations’***

***Post-War Trajectories.”***

Daly’s dissertation seeks to explain variation in post-war political, economic, and security environments. To do so, it assumes an organizational approach and asks, what happens to armed groups after they sign peace accords? Why do they dissolve, return to war, or form non-violent political parties? Her argument centers on the human geography of rebel and paramilitary organizations, specifically their recruitment, deployment, and post-war migration patterns. She propose that if illegal armies recruit in a geographically concentrated area and station their fighters in their home communities, the organizations will persist and transform into legitimate, political entities after disarming. In contrast, armed groups, which recruit in a dispersed fashion and deploy their soldiers away from their towns of origin, lack dense social networks and post-war physical clustering of their combatants. They are thus prone to disintegration. By bankrupting some organizations and preserving others, demobilization has differential effects on armed group collective capacity. Where it weakens a group, it destabilizes the group’s territorial bargains with the state and with other armed actors. It also creates proprietary information and uncertainty about the extent to which it has done so. As a result, resumed war becomes likely. If instead, the distribution of power within the system is maintained, the armed group will, over time, fully demilitarize and be brought into the state’s legal framework. To test the proposed causal logic, she engages in a multi-method approach and rely on rich, survey, violent event, ethnographic, and interview data on the Colombian conflict. By placing the organization at the center of the analysis, the research generates theory on several critical spheres of security studies: a) the inner workings of rebel and paramilitary structures; b) their inter-armed faction alliances and disputes; c) their dynamics with the state; and d) their interactions with civilian populations. The findings dispute the explanatory power of credible commitment problems and economic endowments in accounting for post-war trajectories.

**Andrea Everett,** Princeton University**, “*Symbolic Force or Civilians First?  Highly Capable Democracies and the Design of Peace Operations.”***

The design of peace operations – their political goals, military strategies, resources, and timing – largely determines their capacity to aid and protect civilians threatened by conflict. But the powerful Western democracies with the greatest ability to design and implement ambitious missions often do not intervene in large-scale humanitarian emergencies. When they do, they sometimes initiate peace operations suited to provide effective security and protection. Often, however, they pursue perverse policies that may appear ambitious in certain respects, but which are poorly designed to address civilians’ most pressing needs. How do the leaders of these states decide on the contributions they make to these missions, and on the design of the operations they initiate? Everett develops a theory of competing political incentives arising from domestic pressures both to pursue robust policies likely to save more lives, and to limit the costs and risks of contributions. Depending on the level of pressure for ambitious action and the operational environment, leaders may choose limited, perverse, or robust contributions to these operations. Case studies of Australian responses to three complex emergencies in its region and American policy toward recent peace operations in Darfur, along with statistical analysis of responses to the most devastating post-Cold War conflicts (complex humanitarian emergencies*)* by the US, UK, France, and Australia support the argument.

**Jacqueline L. Hazelton,** Brandeis University, **“*Compellence and Accommodation in Counterinsurgency Warfare*."**

            The United States today defines its greatest security threats as insurgents and terrorists. It is trying to defeat them with a method of counterinsurgency (COIN) known as the population-centric approach. Is the conventional wisdom correct in claiming that the population-centric approach is the key to defeating insurgencies? Apparently not. This project tests the population-centric approach to COIN through a structured, focused comparison, within-case comparison, and process tracing based on archival research and interviews with participants. It finds that purported population-centric successes were not in fact conducted as such. It finds that population-centric COIN is exceedingly difficult to put into practice for reasons inherent to the paradigm. It further asks why states are only able to defeat insurgencies sometimes and develops an alternative theory of COIN success. The population-centric paradigm prescribes building strong, responsive, distributive states while strictly limiting the use of force to avoid civilian casualties. This relative emphasis grows from the assumption that the key to victory is gaining broad popular allegiance to the state and thus marginalizing the insurgency. But Hazelton finds that the population-centric approach is theoretically and empirically mistaken in its assumptions; in its relative emphasis on lots of political reform and only a little fighting; and in its mechanism of building broad popular support. State building and development are processes separate from COIN. Her findings suggest that U.S. policy goals based on the population-centric model may be over-ambitious, extremely costly, and simply impossible to achieve. She argues that COIN success since 1945 is a function of a heavy reliance on the use of force plus limited, targeted political accommodations that together degrade insurgent capabilities in an iterative process of compellence. The state succeeds by fighting, harrying, exhausting, threatening, conciliating, rewarding, and showing the other two key actors – the insurgency and the populace – that guerrilla victory is impossible. Success is not primarily about killing, although at times the counterinsurgent may kill many people. It is primarily about using force to deny victory to the insurgency.  Cases: Dhofar, Oman, 1965-1976: the Philippines-Huks, 1946-1955; Turkey-PKK, 1991-1999; US-Vietnam, 1956-1965; El Salvador, 1979-1992.

**Bo Ram Kwon**, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, ***“The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions Revisited: An Empirical Analysis Using a Bargaining and Enforcement Framework.”***

While scholars have studied the conditions under which states impose economic sanctions, few have systematically examined the question of enforcement, particularly when sender governments are willing to enforce their sanctions laws against their firms. Kwon’s dissertation revisits the question of sanctions effectiveness from a domestic politics perspective. Borrowing insights from bargaining theory, she argues that the effectiveness of sanctions is a function of the ability or willingness of sender states to enforce sanctions laws against their own firms. That is, sanctions are more likely to be effective when sender governments strongly enforce sanctions on their firms to suspend their economic transactions with the target state. This builds on the notion that sender governments not only benefit from successfully coercing the target state but also from the revenues their firms bring home from trading with the target. This implies that sender governments may have disincentives to enforce their sanctions policy, given that the restriction of business transactions with target states may undermine their firms’ competitiveness relative to other foreign firms. It further suggests that while sanctions imposition may have political purposes, enforcement often serves as a tool for governments to allow their stronger firms to force their competitors out of the target’s market. In the first empirical chapter, she tests her theory using large-N quantitative analysis on economic sanctions between 1971-2000, drawing on data from the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) project.

**Neil Narang,** University of California – San Diego, ***“Exploring the Causes and Consequences of Humanitarian Aid in Conflict and Post-Conflict Areas.”***

Narang’s dissertation research investigates the causes and consequences of humanitarian assistance as a peacebuilding strategy in conflict and post-conflict states. Through a series of papers, he explores how and when humanitarian aid can inadvertently prolong civil war when disbursed during conflict, undermine peace when disbursed in the aftermath of civil conflict, and how – as a result of these effects – combatants may strategically respond to aid provisions by violently attacking aid workers. In a separate ongoing research project, he explores the role of reputation in international politics by demonstrating how reputation matters in subtle, often-overlooked ways. Specifically, he shows how past alliance violations can subsequently effect the formation of new alliances, the overall structure of alliance portfolios, and the internal design of alliance contracts.

**Shawn Ling Ramirez**, University of Rochester, “***Power-sharing and Transparency: Accountability and the Domestic Politics of War and Peace."***

Ramirez dissertation draws from formal theory, statistical methods and field work to explore the relationship between domestic accountability and war and peacemaking. First, she argues that war propensity hinges on the degree to which policy-making power is shared, and not simply whether a regime is a democracy or dictatorship; power sharing rules determine who the public holds responsible for war outcomes, while regime type determines the cost of electoral accountability. Second, she shows how the confidentiality of a mediation allows a leader to offer peaceful concessions and avoid domestic punishment. Her results show how public benefits from supporting its leader who potentially backed down in private: peace is more likely, and any ensuing war is more likely to be won. She draws from field work to show how audience uncertainty allowed for the success of the 1998 peace accords between Ecuador and Peru. She also uses statistical analyses to show how domestic pressure and war expectations alter the choice over conflict resolution forums, and their potential success.

**David M. Rodriguez,** University of Wisconsin-Madison**,**  ***Listen, Yankee! The Impact of Castro, Trujillo, and the Puerto Rican Democratic Left on U.S.-Latin American Relations during the Early Cold War.”***

Rodriguez’ dissertation, entitled “explores how a cluster of small islands so close to the United States wielded considerable influence over the development of Washington’s Latin American policy between 1945 and 1965. He focuses on the three Spanish-speaking islands of the Caribbean: Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic. He argues that the process of empire building in the Caribbean that propelled the United States to a position of global dominance in the aftermath of World War II allowed Puerto Rican, Cuban, and Dominican elites—the individuals most familiar with U.S. empire building in the world—to restructure the hegemonial relationship between the U.S. and their own societies and influence the trajectory of U.S. policy toward Latin America. Their proximity to the United States, their understanding of the historic relationship between *el Norte* and Latin America, and their own personal experiences with U.S. empire building in the Caribbean provided these non-U.S. actors with a solid understanding of U.S. power that they used to challenge American hegemony and enter and influence the U.S. policy-making process from within. Rodriguez takes the focus off the customary center of power, Washington, D.C., and shifts it southward to San Juan, Havana, and Santo Domingo.